Differentia: Review of Italian Thought
Number 3 Combined Issue 3-4 Spring/Autumn

Article 8

1989

The Transparency of All Things
Adelino Zanini

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia

Recommended Citation
Zanini, Adelino (1989) "The Transparency of All Things," Differentia: Review of Italian Thought: Vol. 3 ,
Article 8.
Available at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol3/iss1/8

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Academic Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Differentia: Review of Italian Thought by an authorized editor of Academic Commons. For more
information, please contact mona.ramonetti@stonybrook.edu, hu.wang.2@stonybrook.edu.

The Transparency
Of All Things

Adelino Zanini

I

In this paper I wish to discuss a few of the attributes of Politics
[il politico] at the junction between the Modem and Postmodern

ages. Let me begin by making the following assumptions:
A) The Modem is both the apology of the subject and the
dissolution of its individual freedom;
B) The Modem is where this socialization takes on "liturgical
values," which are supposed to negate the mysteries surrounding
social and collective existence;
C) This negation explains but doesn't solve the tragic recourse
to supreme and sublime beings [entita];
D) This negation substitutes theological ratio with that which
disenchantment discloses.
Therefore, if each theodicy can be secularized and god's presence in the world dissolved, what becomes of this transparency
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of all things? How far does Politics, as decisions, still condition
rationally human destiny?
In search of an answer, I will start with J. A. Schumpeter. If
we respect the interpretive rules of economic theory, this intention
may seem rather strange. However, let's assume that these rules
are not completely reliable (Zanini 1987 & 1988). If this hypothesis
is true, one question raised by Schumpeter appears to anticipate
all the others. According to this Austrian scholar (Schumpeter
1954), all political rationalities in modern society are inspired by
rational forma mentis. Yet when in opposition to one another, it
does not necessarily follow that the outcome of the confrontation
is itself rational; indeed, the effects are not rationally explainable.
So the question becomes: How are we to interpret modern events?
In other words: What would happen to the transparency in a
world in which god is disclosed, transfigured into a being who
governs on the basis of the instrumental rationalities of things?
II
There are, of course, many possible answers. I'll begin by
saying that, in Schumpeter's view, the position which argues for
a resistant theological substratum in Politics (Marramao 1983) is
not at all clear. This process of secularization, however undoubtable it may be, is based on yet another illusion: that the nihilism
inherent in the logic of Politics induces an efficient rationalization,
which in a sort of instrumental disenchantment can seize the time
of decision-abandoning
thus any idea of redemption to the
metaphysics of resentment. Such a solution presumes that,
beyond the impossibility of an earthly redemption, there remains
an efficient, albeit arbitrary, answer: a game of possible decisions.
In reality, both this possibility and the fact that it may have a
decipherable sense, or that there are any rules at all for the game,
remain questionable. Therefore, neither the observation on secularization processes, nor the assumption that the sacred has even
"higher" coefficients of resistance to oppose to rationalization,
seems to offer a full answer. In some way, modern disenchantment
discloses more and yet implies, without paradox, fewer solutions.
I think this is the meaning of the undecidable conflict shown by
Schumpeter.
In fact, Schumpeter leaves us with an unsolved puzzle: the
modern relationship between economic science and political system. Schumpeter, one of the greatest scholars of the dissolution
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of neoclassical theory, had understood the political terms of this
dissolution without, however, deducing from them "logical" political consequences. The reasons for this loss can be briefly summarized. Believing in the action of the single entrepreneur-far
more representative than economic theory has shown-Schumpeter did not refer to a Nietzschean figure, but to a Schopenhauerian
individuality, which is the basis for the relationship between the
will of the subject (his business ability) and the representation of
this will (its economic explication). Along this path, however,
having measured the distance between the logical nature of
economic variables and the socio-logical nature of the political
variables, Schumpeter reaches a real metaphysics of the Modern.
Yet he cannot solve the doubleness of the Modern between individuality and socialization (to use Weberian terminology). Therefore, since Politics is unrepresentable according to economic recta
ratio, it escapes from the subject entrepreneur and, in escaping
him, confirms its socialization, its loss of a singular sense. Will
and representation are displaced: the former due to the loss of all
individuality "centered" in itself (think of Sombartian Entseelung),
the latter due to the consequent impossibility of the logical representation of what is the willful action of the single subject.
Schumpeter's arguments may of course seem marginal to the
initial problem, but what is interesting to observe is its paradoxical
effect. The puzzle cannot fail to produce, after Weber, the clear
knowledge that the representatum, the rationality of doing, is not
lost because its forms are hidden, because they are in fact evident.
And what is evident itself does not need to be represented, for
the simple reason that nothing can be added to what is already
evident. And even before Schumpeter, already in Marx, this is
the true meaning of the unfolding of real submission. Utmost
submission is no longer realized through forms of equivalence
since it expresses, in its "natural" being, disproportion as the only
unit of measure. By analogy, in Wittgenstein, the limits of language are in play. How can we enlighten what is already light,
or whose lightness escapes our "sensors"?
In Schumpeter, however, neither Marxian, nor Wittgensteinian knowledge is present; it is not by chance that he accepts the
role of "prophet." The puzzle of the Modern is only avoided. The
fact that the conflict is undecidable leaves no room for rational
expectations, but this gives rise to a void, which Schumpeter tries
to fill, in a Schopenhauerian way, with enlightenment, or prophecy. Sidestepping the puzzle, however, in no way removes the

DIFFERENT/A

68

paradox, which is basically this: the more transparent the modern
condition, the more unlikely its government, since nothing can
be said which is not in the things themselves (Virno 1986): nothing,
except inauspicious prophecy.
The simple mechanism of secularization of the Modern, on
the other hand, does not explain what Schumpeter backs away
from, as it doesn't explain if and how what is itself light is also
in itself clear-not to mention "sensible." Schumpeter's paradox
is usefully provocative, perhaps because it is solved only partially
in the realization of the Modern, anticipating, in spite of everything, some essential lines of escape.
III
These themes are present also in Heidegger (1977). For example, in The Age of the World Picture, he writes: "Science as research
constitutes itself only if truth is transformed into the certainty of
representation." Since Descartes, and including Nietzsche, this is
the course of the subject, which decides its accomplishment. The
representation, the formation of an image of the world, "the configuration of representing production" -as Heidegger himself affirms-is the means by which man tries to be a being "who counts
as a rule and canon for every being." In the end, the struggle
between the different visions of the world expresses the calculating
power of the subject, its "dominating the world," which causes
and ends in the "absorption of modern essence in obviousness."
In my opinion, this obviousness, as it spreads in an incalculable way, does produce a shadow "which escapes representation";
but this shadow, rather than enunciating "something else whose
understanding is denied to us today," seems to solve itself in a
total transparency which escapes representation, not so much
because it is obscure, but because it is too enlightened, clear,
obvious.
It is sufficient to underline here the crucialness of the obvious
as the image of the modern world, and, even before, the constitution of the modern world as the representation of images. For the
question remains: What relationship does man's public destiny,
Politics as human destiny, have with a world where the incumbent
image of a god is not only returned to earth but, even before,
disclosed according to the instrumental rationality of the things
themselves?
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IV
I would like to try to answer this question starting with a
typical concept of political science: the secret. Often, it is well
known, democratic political criticism has appealed to and calls on
"transparency" as the essential criterion of modern democracy.
Interpreting a typical demand of emancipation movements, the
abolition of the secret has always appeared as the essential criterion of publicity, belonging to the public, and therefore subject to
public criticism .
Without meaning to deny or simplify what hails from a complex tradition of thought (Koselleck 1959), I would like to observe
that probably the appeal of transparency, of the publicity of the
choices of the executive power, has never been a suitable concept
for "another" democracy. In other words, I think it has been a
concept appropriateto the absence of secret: a kind of harmless
paradox.
It is sufficiently clear, however, that secretiveness does not
preserve a secret, but rather invents the conditions which ought
to keep a secret-if there is one. Often, the appeal to transparency
is a question of method with respect to substantially known contents-if not, indeed, obvious. Of course, transparency had a
different weight for the bourgeoise parliaments that sprung up
after 1848, when modes, times and channels of information and
the multiplication of information were different. But even in those
times, the demand for transparency was not used for enlightenment, but to force confession. Basically, the demand asked that
instrumental modes of action be represented, because the action
itself was known. Secretiveness was blamed for the failure of
representation, and secretiveness was blamed for the failure of
democracy . Actually, the absence of secrets, clarity, characterizes
most contemporary democracies. In fact, transparency is not a
criterion of discriminating value at all.
It is worthwhile pointing out that the philosophical nature of
my affirmation simply wishes to state that it is very difficult to
deny evidence to what things show because, in general, democracy is a political regime where the exhibition of obviousness is
constant--even if this is not an intrinsic merit, but a historical
acquisition.
Let us refer for a moment to recent experience. The deprivation of the authority of parliaments-incorrectly
called the "crisis"
of representative institutions-is
manifest; the left wing appeals
to transparency in decision making: but what is it that remains
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obscure, or unsaid? Absolutely nothing . Not only: it is just at the
moment when executive power shows its greatest certainty, representative capacity, that the demand for transparency becomes
pure, insignificant dialectical expedient.
V

Of course, to draw hasty conclusions from this would be
improper. Therefore, I will just underline the passage: man's public destiny and modern Politics may become the "business of a
few" simply because they are evident to everyone. The greatest
transparency has paralyzed any demand for clearness. For this
reason, it is also difficult to charge any one political system with
the absence of rationality; more simply, one could blame it for its
criteria of instrumental rationality. In conclusion, taking up the
result of the Schumpeterian paradox again, we may see how the
undecidable conflict is actually a tragic determinant.
How far, then, does modern Politics rationally condition
human destiny? It is one thing if by modern Politics we mean the
mass of experiences which has characterized the world up to a
given time, before ours. It is a different question if we accept the
definition of our times as the impossible accomplishment of the
Modern. In the latter case-leaving aside the validity of the "passage," true or presumed, possible or not, between Modern and
Postmodern-we
might say that it is not really Politics which
conditions human destiny, but its operative techniques . On the
other hand, if we say this, we would reaffirm a hidden truth, a
shadow which holds promise. In the age of its accomplishment,
modern Politics, in fact, deeply conditions human destiny, but
without any rationality; rather, it conditions human destiny in
the most complete obviousness, or transparency. This is the reason
why the human condition is tragic, but for the same reason, the
tragedy is a kind of salvation (Negri 1987).

VI
Having unveiled god, this secularization ripened in the Western ratio has removed all secrets. The deus absconditusis dissolved:
man's destiny is completely disenchanted and therefore completely conditioned by tragedy. But in this tragedy, man does not
expiate any existential or mystic condemnation: it is man's social,
historically determined condition. This destiny is not singular, it
is collective. The absence of the secret forces us to live our destiny
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collectively. It is not the destiny of a people, it is my, our destiny:
it is difference, not solitude. The absence of secrets forces us to
live publicly every moment, total transparency bares any sense
of shame.
In some ways, we are propelled toward an aesthetic of the
tragic perfectly described by Lyotard (1983). The babel of languages, the exponential growth of rationality, the lack of fixed
referents rather than relativizing the power of saying, of being
transparent, amplifies its relevance. One must not stop in the
shade: the shade, like silence, is a way of saying that speaks louder
and states more violently what it would like to hide. But it does
not talk about us: it does not speak to us. Languages talk about
themselves, Politics celebrates its techniques. All this is really
America (Baudrillard 1986), empire of gigantism: nothing is simpler, and therefore impenetrable-as
Heidegger says-everything
is tragic, consuming itself in public, giving rise to an aesthetic of
the tragic in its accomplishment.
Having mentioned Lyotard, we are inevitably reminded of
Wittgenstein: the mystic situated not only in the accomplishment
of linguistic transparency, but where language is no longer man's.
In fact, in the end the game becomes exasperated: it says too
much, it alludes to too many senses-the
mystic is necessary
enchantment. Nevertheless, an aesthetic of the tragic, if it is true
that it describes human destiny as a difference and not as solitude,
seems to invoke positively what in Deleuze, for example, is the
thought of difference: turbines of active forces.
Is there no longer a sublime? Of course, a secularized god is
a jealous, vengeful god. But he too, in this obviousness, is destined
only to transparent liturgies to keep a semblance of a mystical,
ineffable body. On the contrary, to imperfect bodies belongs the
sign of difference and contingency. The great Cartesian fiction is
dead, the omnipotent subject is dead: after Foucault, the attributes
of the ratio to the perfect body are disclosed. But because of this,
the unfinished accomplishment of the Modern leaves a much
more significant paradox unsolved: an ensemble of collective subjects, whose bodies speak, whose reasons listen .
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